Research

Working papers

Abstract: This paper studies a population of players of unobservable private types. These players are randomly matched with each other to play games with strategic substitutes. Two models are considered. Players hold either type-independent beliefs or self-similar beliefs, i.e. higher types believe that their opponents are also of higher types. The first result of the paper characterizes the cross-game behavioral implications of the first model. It is then shown that the two models are behaviorally equivalent for games with weak strategic substitutes. For these games, it suffices to analyze players' behavior with the parsimonious model. On the other hand, analysts should look at games with strong strategic substitutes to test for self-similar beliefs.

Decision Making under Time Pressure

Abstract: This paper studies individual decision making when deadlines are random. It establishes the relationship between a decision maker’s preference over timed choice problems and her set of feasible information acquisition paths. The decision maker’s preference over random deadlines satisfies the vNM independence axiom if her optimal way to acquire information depends only on the menu. Moreover, the decision maker’s distaste for contingent planning, a time-consuming activity, becomes weaker as she is allowed more time. Up to normalization, the decision maker’s utility function, prior belief and feasibility set of information paths can be identified from her preference over time choice problems.

Putting Yourself in Someone Else's Shoes: Mirror-Image Mapping in Strategic Decision Making

Abstract: This paper characterizes the behavior of a backward inducting first mover (the decision maker) in a two-stage extensive form game. Having limited knowledge of her fellow player's preference, the decision maker maps each outcome to its mirror image and infers the second mover's behavior using her own preference. The axioms can be used to test whether such a decision-making procedure is at work. The decision maker's preference over the outcomes and the mirror-image mapping she applies are both identified from her choice in the first stage of the game. The constructive identification result demonstrates how to reveal the decision maker's perception of her fellow player's choice problems.